01 / SECURITY
Protect the AI system.
Source analysis, runtime security testing, agent and tool exposure, data paths and MCP or tenant-boundary risks.
Explore HAIEC AI Security ↗AI security protects what agents can reach. Governance defines what they should be allowed to do. HAIEC Assurance connects those findings with qualified evidence to establish what can be defended, what remains uncertain, and what the accountable team should do next.
One consequential action. Independent evidence views. A bounded, inspectable evaluation.
HAIEC has capabilities across all three. Assurance draws on each relevant source without pretending a passed scan or documented policy answers every consequential question.
01 / SECURITY
Source analysis, runtime security testing, agent and tool exposure, data paths and MCP or tenant-boundary risks.
Explore HAIEC AI Security ↗02 / GOVERNANCE
Operating boundaries, policy decisions, approvals, delegated discretion and accountable human ownership.
Explore HAIEC Governance ↗03 / ASSURANCE
Compare what was requested, authorized, granted, code-capable and observed. Apply deterministic evaluation, reveal proof gaps and record the result.
Explore the assurance decision →Choose an AI action, inspect the evidence and see why a valid tool call can still leave a consequential question unresolved.
Change the destination of a small refund
The available source path supports a possible refund API call. That is a finding worth investigating even before other evidence has been connected.
The support agent was asked to correct a billing error. A correction request does not inherently authorize the agent to select a new recipient.
A security scan can establish a code-capable route. IAM can establish a qualified grant. Policy can establish a permitted boundary. Runtime evidence can establish an observed action. None silently proves another.
It tests the relationship between available delegation facts, approved scope and actual capability or activity. It is a comparator, not a sixth evidence plane.
Qualified evidence, applicable rules and proof limits determine the recorded conclusion. AI can operate the workflow, but it does not author the canonical verdict.
The five views are independent analytical questions, not five mandatory collection steps. This diagram illustrates the evaluation model.
Assurance makes the consequence, supporting facts, gaps and accountable next step inspectable in one scoped record.
A code-capable refund path and a limited operating policy are visible in the scenario. Neither alone proves delegated recipient selection.
Which approved person or policy authorized the agent to choose a different recipient, and what did the target system actually execute?
The accountable business owner provides the delegation decision; the team then evaluates qualified evidence within fresh scope.
The evaluated evidence supports the statement within the stated scope.
Only part of the relevant relationship, path, or evidence surface is established.
Available evidence cannot support a stronger conclusion.
That evidence family was not evaluated in this scope.
A control being listed is not a control being proven. HAIEC separates cataloged expectations, relevant controls, evidence actually evaluated, contradictions and missing proof. A control count is not a coverage score. Explore Controls and Evidence →
Source Reachability is adjacent context. It helps explain supported relationships among agents, tools, handlers, resources and evaluation surfaces. A source-capable path is not an observed action; a credential reference is not an effective grant; missing runtime evidence is not proof that an action did not happen.
Agent-driven does not mean agent-decided. Interface automation changes how the workflow is operated. It does not change the evidence semantics or assign the Assurance disposition.
Choose the evidence and assessment appropriate to the system and the decision. These are common activities, not a mandatory sequence for every evaluation.
Start with a source-visible path, connected system or specific authority question that matters to the business.
Use eligible code, policy, access, identity, control and runtime evidence. Preserve missing and partial coverage.
HAIEC applies selected deterministic rules to the evidence and reports an explicitly scoped conclusion.
Give the owner a report and next action. Verify supported artifacts and reassess as relevant evidence changes.
Connect a compatible AI coding assistant through authenticated MCP. The agent can preflight and operate approved evaluations. HAIEC determines the evaluation.
Run HAIEC AI AssuranceEndpoint https://www.haiec.com/api/mcp. Connection and authorized scope are required. A read-only preflight checks organization, system, source, role and consent eligibility; writes and active testing require explicit approval.
Assurance is strongest when every conclusion says exactly which evidence supports it.
Security and governance contribute important questions and evidence. Assurance evaluates relevant facts, authority, actual capability and observation to reach a scoped conclusion. It is not a simple sum or an additional scanner.
Not by itself. A scan can establish code-capable behavior within its scope. Delegated discretion requires appropriate policy or human authority evidence.
No. Unknown means the available evidence cannot establish the claim. It is different from a verified violation and different from a passed check.
No. ALLOW is a conclusion within the evaluated scope and qualified input only, not universal safety or target-side enforcement.
No. The outcome records an evaluator disposition. Target-side enforcement requires a separately connected and supported control with evidence of its actual operation.
Yes. Supported early findings, such as a source-visible consequential path, can be valuable. The depth of the subsequent assurance conclusion depends on the evidence needed for the chosen claim.
Start with one AI system, one consequential action and the evidence needed to decide responsibly.