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Agent Model

An agent is capabilities, bound to identity, bound to authority.

HAIEC models an AI agent as a set of capabilities bound to a runtime identity bound to an authority chain. Every claim about an agent resolves to evidence — or renders honestly as unknown.

Five evidence planes

Five independent analytical planes — not a causal sequence. Each is a distinct evidence type with its own limitations. A gap between any two is a finding, not a safe state.

1

Requested

What the request asked for — intent as declared, not assumed.

2

Policy-authorized

What policy and configuration evidence establishes as permitted.

3

Effectively granted

What credential evidence establishes — not guaranteed actual authority.

4

Code-capable

What application and source evidence establishes can technically occur.

5

Observed

What connected runtime evidence establishes was observed.

Agent detail view showing the five evidence planes side by side
Agent detail — asked, allowed, granted, code-capable, and observed rendered side by side — Product screenshot, synthetic demo environment.

Chains & comparisons

Capability chain

What a task requires vs. what the agent can actually do — the required set is compared against the observed capability set. A gap is a finding class: unmet requirement, unobserved grant, or capability exceeding what was requested. Capability is what the code can do — not evidence it is safe.

Delegation chain

Whether a human or authorized process actually delegated the consequential choice — authority narrowing (each hop can only shrink scope), scope monotonicity, and chain continuity. A break in the chain is rendered, not averaged away.

DAI — four-fact comparison

Delegated Action Integrity compares four independently-evidenced facts per surface: what was delegated, what the code is capable of, what credentials grant, and what was observed. Divergence between any two is surfaced — never reconciled silently.

What this model does not claim

  • Evidence is not assurance — evidence feeds an evaluation; it is not a verdict.
  • Source capability is not safety — established capability proves reach, not permission.
  • Missing runtime data is not proof nothing happened — absent evidence renders as unknown.
  • Unknown is never presented as pass.

Sources of truth: lib/assurance/agent-action-capability.ts, lib/ai-security/agent-view-read-model.ts, and the evidence contract in lib/evidence/.